On flexibility

By building on theoretical work by Mills and Schumann (1985) and Ungern-Sternberg (1990) this paper provides evidence on the determinants of two dimensions of flexibility, the flexibility in adjusting aggregate output over time (tactical flexibility) as well as the ability to switch quickly between products (operational flexibility). Econometric analysis of a sample of 40.000 farms in Upper-Austria for the period 1980 to 1990 suggests that larger full-time farms operated by younger, better educated farm operators are more flexible, ceteris paribus. The results further indicate a significant and negative interrelationship between tactical and operational flexibility. --tactical and operational flexibility,panel data,farm households

Determinants and Dynamics of Farm Diversification

This paper examines the impact of various farm and household characteristics (such as farm size, the off-farm employment status, the farm operator's age and schooling and the number of family members) on the level as well as the dynamics of on-farm diversification. Using linked census data for Upper-Austria from 1980, 1985 and 1990 we provide evidence that smaller farms are more specialised and also tend to increase the degree of specialisation over time more quickly than large farms. A significantly lower degree of diversification (higher degree of specialisation) as well as a stronger reduction in diversification over time is also reported for businesses operated by older, less educated, part-time farm operators. The analysis of diversification dynamics also suggests that (a) farms adjust to changes in their environment by steadily approaching their long-run equilibrium level of diversification (b-convergence), and (b) the variance of the diversification distribution declines over time (s-convergence). --

Determinants and Dynamics of Farm Diversification

This paper examines the impact of various farm and household characteristics (such as farm size, the off-farm employment status, the farm operator's age and schooling and the number of family members) on the level as well as the dynamics of on-farm diversification. Using linked census data for Upper-Austria from 1980, 1985 and 1990 we provide evidence that smaller farms are more specialised and also tend to increase the degree of specialisation over time more quickly than large farms. A significantly lower degree of diversification (higher degree of specialisation) as well as a stronger reduction in diversification over time is also reported for businesses operated by older, less educated, part-time farm operators. The analysis of diversification dynamics also suggests that (a) farms adjust to changes in their environment by steadily approaching their long-run equilibrium level of diversification ( B-convergence), and (b) the variance of the diversification distribution declines over time ( O-convergence).Diversification, Farm Sector, Dynamics, Panel Data, Farm Management,

Margin Squeeze in Fixed-Network Telephony Markets – competitive or anticompetitive?

This paper looks at the effects of different forms of wholesale and retail regulation on retail competition in fixed network telephony markets. We explicitly model two asymmetries between the incumbent operator and the entrant: (i) While the incumbent has zero marginal costs, the entrant has the wholesale access charge as (positive) marginal costs; (ii) While the incumbent is setting a two-part tariff at the retail level (fixed fee and calls price), the entrant can only set a linear price for calls. Competition from other infrastructures such as mobile telephony or cable is modelled as an ‘outside opportunity’ for consumers. We find that a horizontally differentiated entrant with market power may be subject to a margin squeeze due to double marginalization but will never be completely foreclosed. Entrants without market power might be subject to a margin squeeze if the wholesale access price is set at average costs and competitive pressure from other infrastructures increases. We argue that a wholesale price regulation at average costs is not optimal in such a situation and discuss retail minus and deregulation as potential alternatives.access regulation, foreclosure, margin squeeze, telecommunications, fixed networks

Do we (still) need to regulate fixed network retail markets?

In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower calls prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high calls prices to too low calls prices which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. We look at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, e.g. mobile telephony. We conclude that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and increase market power but can also result from increased inter-model competition. If this is the case, we argue that regulators should consider alternatives to cost oriented access prices such as retail minus or complete deregulation.access regulation, vertical integration, foreclosure, price squeeze, telecommunications, fixed networks

Efficient contracts for government intervention in promoting next generation communications networks

Although the future socio-economic benefits of a new fibre-based (“next generation access”, NGA) telecommunications infrastructure seem to be uncontroversial, a universal NGA coverage appears to be a rather unrealistic objective without government intervention. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on NGA infrastructure-based services and the public authorities’ incomplete information about the capital costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the NGA provider

Wie die Digitale Transformation der Wirtschaft gelingt

Die Digitale Transformation gilt als eine der großen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit. Schnelles Internet, mobile Endgeräte, intelligente Softwarealgorithmen und die Speicherung und Verarbeitung großer Datenmengen verändern wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Prozesse. Die zahlreichen Dimensionen der Digitalisierung machen die Transformation von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft zu einem komplexen Unterfangen. Jedoch können die Chancen, die die Digitalisierung eröffnet, wie die Entwicklung neuer Produkte und Dienste oder die Steigerung der Produktivität, nur dann genutzt werden, wenn man sich den damit verbundenen Herausforderungen aktiv und gestalterisch stellt. Die neue Bundesregierung hat sich in ihrem Koalitionsvertrag1 zahlreiche und ambitionierte Ziele für die Digitalisierung gesetzt, die verschiedene gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Bereiche und so gut wie alle Ministerien betreffen. Aus der Perspektive der Wirtschaft sind insbesondere drei Aspekte zentral: der weitere Ausbau der Breitbandinfrastruktur, die Unterstützung mittelständischer Unternehmen bei der Digitalisierung sowie die Stärkung digitaler Kompetenzen. In allen drei Bereichen hat Deutschland Nachholbedarf

The impact of regulation and competition on the migration from old to new communications infrastructure : recent evidence from EU27 member states

Fibre-deployment of next-generation communications networks is currently a major challenge for investing firms as well as for national regulators and is also subject to hot debates at EU level. This work examines the role of regulatory policies and competition controlling for relevant supply and demand side factors. Our econometric model employs dynamic panel data methods that take into account potential endogeneity due to omitted heterogeneity, reverse causality and the dynamic investment specification. Our results indicate that relevant forms of previous broadband access regulations have had a negative impact on investment in new infrastructure. Furthermore, infrastructure-based competition from mobile operators and the replacement effect stemming from the incumbents’ existing infrastructure exert a negative impact on ex ante investment incentives. As regards the dynamics of the adjustment process, we find that there are both short-term and long-term effects towards the desired infrastructure level

Facility- and Service-based Competition and Investment in Fixed Broadband Networks: Lessons from a Decade of Access Regulations in the European Union Member States

This paper employs firm-level panel data of 57 incumbent and entrant firms for 23 European countries in the decade from 2003 to 2012. We examine the impact of service- and facility-based competition on firm level investment as well as the strategic effects underlying infrastructure investment decisions. At the same time we explicitly model the structural dynamics of broadband investment using dynamic panel estimation techniques. We find that facility-based competition exerts a positive and significant impact on both incumbents and entrants implying that incumbents' and entrants' investment decisions are strategic complements. Moreover, this strategic complementarity is much more pronounced with respect to the entrants. Finally, we show that service-based competition appears to have no significant impact on the investment decision of incumbents and entrants and that there is no supportive evidence for the so-called "ladder of investment" hypothesis. With respect to the later phase of market regulation, service-based competition exerts a negative impact on entrants' investment. (authors' abstract)Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economic

The impact of alternative public policies on the deployment of new communications infrastructure - a survey

Our survey reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on all alternative policies to promote the deployment of new fiber-based communications infrastructure. Since such investment is expected to induce substantial positive externalities, dynamic efficiency becomes a particularly important policy goal. The available policies refer to i) different kinds of ex ante sector-specific regulations including cost-based access regulations as well as softer regulations such as regulatory holidays or geographically differentiated regulations, ii) deregulatory approaches based on effective competition law implementation and competitive market structures including allowance of co-investment models, and iii) public subsidies to cover non-profitable (“white”) areas. Our survey identifies the most significant research gaps, finding that numerous studies related to the impact of access regulations exist, whereas only a much smaller branch of literature addresses the impact of competition policies, and even fewer studies analyze the impact of public subsidies on new communications deployment. Moreover, our work allows for a generic framework for policy recommendations that identifies the comparative advantages of the individual policy options for different market structures and for varying degrees of externalities. We find that public subsidies are the dominant policy alternative in white areas, whereas access regulations can be the preferred policy in white or “grey” areas, where only monopoly structure or co-investment models lead to private investment. Deregulatory policies might be preferable in grey areas, if there is sufficient pressure from competitive outside options and if competition law is strong. Finally, deregulatory policies including soft regulation are the dominant policy in “black” areas, where several independent infrastructure operators exist